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FINAL EXAMINATION 
Civil Procedure 
Mr. Curtis 
I 
John Rolfe is a resident and domiciliary of Virginia. On 
June 1,1969 1 he purchased an automobile from the Stanley Steamer 
Car Agency, a Virginia corporation ,,,hich does business only in 
Virginia. In purchasing the vehicle, Rolfe paid $50 down and 
signed a contract for the balance of the purchase price obligating 
himself to make 12 consecutive monthly payments of $50 each to the 
seller. Immediately after completing the purchase, Rolfe called 
upon Jerimiah Witless, an authorized agent of the Reckless Insur-
ance Company, who sold Rolfe an automobile liability policy on 
behalf of the Reckless Insurance Company. Reckless is incorpor-
ated in Virginia, has its principal and sole office in Virginia, 
retains agents in Virginia, but has no offices or agents outside 
Virginia. However, Reckless Insurance Company does place adver-
tisements in nationally circulated magazines solliciting mail 
order applications for life insurance. About sixty percent of 
the company's income is derived from the issuance of life insur-
ance policies to non-Virginians. 
Two weeks after purchasing the car, Rolfe began a business 
trip to New York in the new vehicle. En route he stopped over 
in Baltimore, Maryland, where he registered at the Sportsmen 
Motel on the evening of June 15, 1969. Reginald Vulture, a 
resident of Maryland, heard that Rolfe was in Baltimore and 
had recently bought the car from Stanley Steamer. Sometime 
earlier Vulture also had bought a car from Stanley Steamer, 
and Vulture believed Stanley Steamer had tortiously misrepresented 
the condition of the vehicle. On June 16, 1969, Vulture sued 
Stanley Steamer in a Haryland State court and obtained a writ 
of attachment over the debt owed Stanley Steamer by Rolfe. 
The local sheriff, after being unable to locate Rolfe, served pro-
cess (including the writ) upon Hiss Clark, the resident manager 
of the Sportsmen. On the evening of the 16th, as Rolfe was 
checking out of the motel Hiss Clark handed him the papers left 
by the sheriff. Rolfe read the papers, tore them up, discarded 
them, and proceeded to New York. The next day the clerk of 
the Haryland court sent notice of Vulture's suit to Stanley 
Steamer. Upon receipt of the notice, Stanley Steamer by return 
mail sent the following letter to the Maryland court: "Dear 
Judge Mansfield, I donit owe Vulture a red cent. This whole 
thing is a farce. If I were you, I won't proceed any further with 
the matter. James Berry, Vice President, Stanley Steamer Car Agency. 11 
After receiving this letter, the Maryland court rendered judgment 
against Stanley Steamer for $1,000 and issued an order compelling 
Rolfe to send his monthly installment payments to Vulture. Both 
Stanley Steamer and Rolfe were notified of the judgment, and both 
ignored it. 
In the meantime, Rolfe had arrived in New York, but not before 
he had been involved in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania in 
which Jason Helpless had been seriously injured. Several months 
later, after Rolfe had returned to Virginia, Helpless filed suit 
in Pennsylvania State court against Rolfe, alleging that the injuries 
he sustained in the accident were caused by Rolfe's ne~ligence. and 
that those injuries amounted to $120,000. Helpless, hm~ever, did not 
attempt to serve Rolfe; rather he named the Reckless Insurance 
Company as defendant-garnishee, and served the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Commission under a State statute which provided, in pertinent part: 
IIAny insurance company doing business in this Commonwealth shall be 
deemed to have appointed the Insurance Commission as its arent to 
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receive service of process in any action directly or indirectly arising 
out of or related to its insurance business." As required by statute, 
the Insurance Commission by mail notified Reckless and Rolfe of the 
action. Subsequently, judgment for $60,000, the policy limit, was 
rendered against Reckless, which had appeared unsuccessfully in the 
action to contest jurisdiction. Reckless thereupon paid $60,000 to 
Helpless. 
Quite awhile later, but within all applicable statutes of limita-
tion, Vulture filed suit in a Virginia court against Stanley Steamer 
and Rolfe to enforce the Maryland judgment. Stanley Steamer and Rolfe 
moved to dismiss on the ground that the Maryland decres was a nullity. 
Simultaneously Helpless sued Rolfe in another Virginia court 
to collect $60,000 for damages arising out of the automobile accident. 
Reckless refused to defend Rolfe 'tlTho then impleaded Reckless. Reck-
less resists the impleader on the ground th~t it discharged its 
duties under the policy when it paid the $60,000 judgment. Hhat 
dispositions should the Virginia courts make of these two suits? 
II 
Part 1. Joe Thundercloud, a Mohigan Indian, residing in New York State, 
organized a sit-in demonstration directed against the Syracuse, New 
York, Elks Club, on July 4, 1971. Joe and several other Nohigans 
entered the premises of the Elks Club, sat down in the main lobby, and 
refused to leave until the club accepted their applications for member-
ship in the club. They were advised by a representative of the club 
that Mob1gans were not eligible for membership and that their applica-
tions would not be entertained. When the demonstrators persisted in 
their sit-in, the Elks Club had them arrested under a local trespass 
statute. 
In the course of the July 4 sit-in, Joe had seized a briefcase 
owned by Charles Hughes, a Virginia resident who had been a guest of the 
Elks Club and had left his briefcase in the lobby while he availed him-
self of the respite of the restroom. Unfortunately, Hughes had placed a 
rare Etruscan statue in his briefcase. Joe had seized the briefcase in 
order to use it as a weapon to employ in fighting off the police who had 
been called to arrest him. During the arrests, Joe struck police offi-
cer, Elmer Fudd, over the head with the briefcase and thereby inflicted 
a brain concussion on Fudd and shattered the statue. 
Hughes afterward sued Joe for conversion of the vase in a New York 
court, alleging that the statue was valued at $15,000. Fudd also joined 
in the action, claiming that the personal injuries he suffered at Joe's 
hands amounted to $3, 000 . Joe sought to remove both cases to a New York 
federal court, claiming, among other things, that his actions ~lTere 
privileged under federal civil rights' legislation and that a substantial 
federal question was presented. Hughes and Fudd moved to remand the 
case to the State court. 
How should the federal court rule on the motion? 
Part 2. Assume the motion is denied and trial on the merits is had. 
After the presentation of evidence, Joe's lawyer asks for the follmlTing 
instruction; "If you,rnembers of the jury, find that the defendant had 
a right under federal law to be present in the Elks Club on the day in 
question, you must find for the defendant." Plaintiff's counsel objects 
to the instruction on the ground that under New York tort law, even 
where a private privilege is invoked, one who injures another or 
another's property must compensate the other. 
Should the instruction be given? 
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Part 3. Assume that the jury renders verdict in favor of both plain-
ti:fs in the above suit. Thereafter, Joe travels to the Mohigan Annual 
Tnbal Reunion in Vermont. ifuile Joe is in Vermont, he is served '''ith 
the process of a Vermont court in an action against him brought by the 
Elks Club International for trespass ariSing out of the July 4 sit-in. 
The Elks Club International was the legal owner of the premises occupied 
by the Syracuse chapter. Since Joe was a non-resident of Vermont, Elks 
Club International also attached Joe's automobile which he had brought 
with him to the reunion. Joe appeared before the Vermont court for the 
sole purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over his person 
and ~utomobile. The court , however , found that, while personal juris-
dict10n over Joe was doubtful, jurisdiction in rem was properly acquired 
~er the car. Joe immediately withdrew from the action, did not join 
1ssue on the merits, and returned to New York. The Vermont court then 
found the car to be worth $500 and gave judgment in that amount for Elks 
Club International. 
Elks Club International believed it had suffered losses of Sl,500 
. in the sit-in and thus instituted a neH trespass suit against Joe in a 
New York court. Joe moves to dismiss the action on res judicata grounds 
and counterclaims for $500 asserting that the Vermont attachment deprived 
him of property without due process since the Vermont court lack~d 
~urisdiction. The Elks Club moves to dismiss the counterclaim on res 
judicata grounds. 
How should the New York court rule on Joe's motion? 
III 
Part 1. Dick Macy was seriously injured in an accident in his home on 
April 1, 1971. He is taken for treatment to the office of Spiro Spock, 
11. D., who determined that a blood transfusion was necessary to save 
Macy's life. Spock thereupon transfused blood into l:1acy. Thereafter, 
Hacy developed hepatitis, which he believed was transmitted to him in 
the transfusion. On Hardl 15. 1972 , Macy filed suit in a Virginia State 
court against Spock for damages suffered in contracting hepatitis. 
Hacy's complaint, in pertinent part, alleged that Spock sold blood 
to him in the scope of Spock's regular business, that the blood so sold 
was contaminated with hepatitis, that in selling such blood, Spock 
impliedly warranted that the blood was \vholesome and fit for its intended 
use, and that as the result of Spock's breach of these implied warran-
ties, Hacy suffered injury. 
Spock filed a timely answer in which he (1) asked dismissal of the 
complaint on the ground that Virginia law did not treat a transfusion 
administered by a licensed physiCian as a sale and that no implied war-
ranties were therefore made, and (2) sought to implead Kutter 
Laboratories, a California corporatioThon the theory that he had pur-
chased the blood from Kutter Laboratories and that any claim ariSing out 
of the transfusion lay only against Kutter. 
Assume in answering this question that Virginia follows the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The court on April 2, 1972, ruled that riacy had not stated a claim 
under Virginia law for the reason advanced in Spock's answer and dismissed 
the action as to Spock. However, the court did allow the impleader and 
permitted Macy to amend his complaint to state a claim against Kutter on 
a strict liability theory (hereinafter referred to as the third-party 
claim). Spack had already. obtained proper service upon Kutter. Immedi-
ately after the court took the above. action .. ~acy moved to amend his 
complaint to allege that Spock had been negligent in transfusing him 
with the infected blood. Spack demurred to the amendment on the ground 
that the applicable one year statute of limitations had run. 
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Kutter Laboratories lodged t.imQ1y ol"jo<,>~_,L_ ... ~- "1._ .1.-,.l_e~cn:' and 
third-party claim. 
The court overruled Kucter Laboratories' objection and Spock's 
demurrer. Were these rulings correct? 
Part 2. After its objection was overruled, Kutter Laboratories answered 
by admitting it had sold contaminated blood to Spock but moving that no 
privity existed between itself and Hacy, and therefore, as a matter of 
law, the third-party claim should be dismissed. Spock by affidavit 
alleged that there is no known test for determining the presence of 
hepatitis in blood and appended to the affidavit sworn statements of 
three well-known medical school professors to the same effect. On the 
basis of the affidavit, Spock moved for summary judgment on the theory 
that there was no basis for finding negligence. Macy replied with his 
own affidavit asserting that the existence of a test for hepatitis is a 
fact question for the jury and that the truthfulness of the professor's 
statements likewise should be left to the jury. Macy asked that the 
motion for summary judgment be denied and informed the court that he 
intended to cross-examine the professors vigorously at trial. Macy 
also moved for summary judgment against Kutter Laboratories on the 
ground that it was clear under Virginia law that privity was not 
required under the facts alleged in his pleadings. 
Haw should the court rule on these motions? 
